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Teodor CĂLUGĂRU, Constantin-Sebastian LAZĂR, Aurel-Alberto URSACHE, "Cybersecurity in the Transportation Sector: Closing the Revocation Gap in the European Smart Tachograph", Romanian Cyber Security Journal, ISSN 2668-6430, vol. 8(2), pp. 93-110, 2026. https://doi.org/10.54851/v8i2y202607

Romanian Cyber Security Journal / Fall 2026, No. 2, Vol. 8

Cybersecurity in the Transportation Sector: Closing the Revocation Gap in the European Smart Tachograph

Teodor CĂLUGĂRU, Constantin-Sebastian LAZĂR, Aurel-Alberto URSACHE


Abstract

Modern European smart tachograph infrastructures rely on Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Advanced Encryption Standard primitives to enforce data authenticity and operational security. However, certificates are verified statically, so a compromised credential remains trusted until it expires. This paper discusses these challenges in transportation networks and proposes a lightweight extension to the existing public key infrastructure that keeps the same trusted authorities while dynamically verifying the revocation status of the certificates involved. An initial software implementation shows that the exposure period of a compromised certificate is reduced from the remaining validity period, up to thousands of days, to the statusupdate interval.

Keywords

Operational Technology Security, Revocation Gap, Smart Tachograph, Trust Infrastructure, Public Key Infrastructure

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